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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), it 
is inconceivable that any terrorist group, let alone one connected with       
al-Qaeda, could raise enough money to mount an attack on a similar scale 
through donations. Furthermore, given the visibility and scrutiny of transac-
tions conducted through the formal banking system, any financier of      
terrorism would take a huge risk today were he to transfer money to a 
known terrorist entity without covering his tracks.  
Global terrorism is in decline. As far as al-Qaeda is concerned, the 
theories of people like Abdullah Azzam, who promoted the idea of global 
terrorism,1 and of Osama bin Laden, who carried it out,2 no longer appeal as 
  
  Richard Barrett is the Coordinator of the United Nations al-Qaeda and Taliban Monitor-
ing Team. Mr. Barrett is also a member of the U.N. Task Force to promote implementation 
of the Global Strategy to Counter Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly in September 
2006. He is the co-chair of two working groups, one that examines what leads people to 
terrorism and one that explores the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Before taking up 
his present position he worked with the British government both in London and abroad, 
serving with the Security Service, the Foreign Office and the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS).  
 1 See, e.g., Asaf Maliach, Abdullah Azzam, al-Qaeda, and Hamas: Concepts of Jihad and 
Istishhad, 2 MIL. & STRATEGIC AFF. 79, 81 (2010) (“Abdullah Azzam designated the [first 
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they did. Even among the al-Qaeda leadership, the emphasis is now on ac-
tion at a local level, or against the ‘near enemy,’ as it came to be called, 
rather than attacks on the ‘far enemy.’3 Although some local groups       
certainly retain a capability to mount attacks elsewhere, they are less  
threatening to global peace and security than at any time since the beginning 
of the century. The association between terrorist groups that profess similar 
ideologies is now far more evident in their verbal communications than in 
any effective operational cooperation between them. 
II. HAVE CFT REGIMES CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECLINE IN TERRORISM? 
The first question: Is the difficulty that terrorist groups face in rais-
ing, storing and moving money connected to their increasing lack of       
viability? 
It is tempting to say yes; and indeed many people do so without res-
ervation, particularly those legislators and regulators who are the architects 
and supporters of the Counter Financing of Terrorism (CFT) regimes that 
now cover most of the world.  
A. Progress and Challenges in CFT 
There has been a huge investment in countering the financing of ter-
rorism as a result of regulations introduced since 9/11, most of it extracted 
from the private sector.4 Almost all of this effort has focused on terrorist 
financing through the formal banking system, with some more recent at-
tempts to include other money or value transfer services, cash couriers and 
the not-for-profit sector.5 
  
wave of jihad supporters] as the force to implement the global Islamic jihad doctrine that he 
preached in Afghanistan.”).  
 2 See id. at 90 (discussing Bin Laden’s adoption of Azzam’s philosophies). 
 3 See Murad Batal al-Shishani, Al-Qaeda Leader Targets “Near Enemy,” ASIA TIMES 
(June 17, 2001), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/south_asia/mf17df01.html (discussing the 
thematic shift in speeches and other materials from “far enemy” to “near enemy” among 
emerging al-Qaeda leadership after bin Laden’s death). But see, e.g., Ken Sofer, The Evolu-
tion of Terrorism Since 9/11, CENTER AM. PROGRESS (2011), http://www.americanprogress. 
org/issues/2011/09/evolution_of_terrorism.html (discussing bin Laden’s focus on the “far 
enemy” and noting that, even after bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda is one of the few U.S.-
recognized, transnational terrorist groups).  
 4 See Sir James Sassoon, Pres. Fin. Action Task Force, Keynote Address at the Counter-
ing Financing of Terrorism Seminar 4 (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/60/51/40144609.pdf (discussing the importance of working with the private sector 
because of the significant impact on and role of the financial sector in combating terrorism 
financing).  
 5 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], TERRORIST FINANCING 11–26 (2008) (outlining 
the variety of ways terrorists acquire and transfer funds and the need to regulate these out-
lets).   
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Not only have CFT regulations made it harder for potential donors 
to send money to terrorist groups, but along with the introduction of new 
rules in areas such as customer due diligence, they have raised awareness of 
possible terrorist financing among front end staff at banks and other finan-
cial institutions. 
The 9/11 Commission found that the nineteen hijackers responsible 
for the attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had opened bank ac-
counts, established inter-connected drawing rights, received several interna-
tional money transfers and generally paid little heed to the possibility that 
their financial activity might alert anyone to their plans.6 There is no doubt 
that if an investigator had had reason to suspect one member of the group, 
given time, he could have unraveled the plot, as well as its overseas spon-
sors, with the help of relevant banking records. Indeed, the hijackers were 
so unconcerned about surveillance of their financial transactions that they 
made arrangements to return any surplus in their accounts at the time of the 
attacks to the al-Qaeda central pot.7 
If there was a failure to connect the dots before 9/11, it was not in 
the area of investigating al-Qaeda’s financial arrangements. The nineteen 
hijackers did nothing that stood out or was in any way illegal. Even in the 
state of high anxiety and raised awareness that followed the attacks of Sep-
tember 2001, similar transactions would very likely have gone unnoticed. 
This may be less true in 2012, but in the millions of transactions 
that take place every day, it generally requires an additional piece of infor-
mation to draw one’s attention to any specific activity, even in the formal 
sector. The search for terrorist financing indicators, as shown by the study 
conducted by Professors Sue Eckert,8 Richard Gordon9 and Nikos Passas10 
  
 6 See JOHN ROTH, DOUGLAS GREENBURG & SERENA WILLE, MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST 
FINANCING: STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMISSION 52–53 (2004) (providing an extensive over-
view of the funding mechanisms prior to 9/11).   
 7 See id. at 141–42 (discussing the return of funds to al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks).  
 8 Professor Sue E. Eckert is a senior fellow at the Watson Institute, Brown University’s 
center for research and education on global security and international political economy. Her 
current research focuses on issues at the intersection of international security and political 
economy—terrorist financing, targeted sanctions, cybersecurity, and critical infrastructure 
protection. At the Watson Institute, she co-directs the projects on Terrorist Financing and 
Targeted Sanctions and a new cybersecurity initiative. Ms. Eckert works extensively with 
U.N. bodies to enhance the instrument of targeted sanctions, having participated in series of 
multilateral initiatives (the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm Processes), and organiz-
ing workshops and simulations for the Security Council. From 1993 to 1997, as Assistant 
Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, Ms. Eckert was responsible for U.S. dual-
use export control policy and defense industrial base programs. 
 9 Professor Richard Gordon teaches courses on corporate governance, financial sector 
regulation, money laundering and terrorism financing, and international and comparative 
taxation at Case Western Reserve University. Previously, Mr. Gordon practiced law at Dew-
ey Ballantine (now Dewey & LeBoeuf) in Washington and taught at the School of Oriental 
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through 2010 and 2011,11 on the information available to them, has turned 
up little that could be used as a guide to CFT. They have found a similarity 
between money-laundering techniques and some financing of terrorism 
techniques, but nothing that reliably indicates the latter.12 
Every terrorist attack needs funding, and any attack, even those 
perpetrated by an individual acting on his own, will involve some form of 
detectable financial transaction. On many occasions this will pass through 
the regulated financial sector and it is important that banks and other finan-
cial institutions look out for anything that might give intelligence and law 
enforcement officials a useful lead.  
B. Terrorist Fund-Raising 
Where and how terrorists raise money is as important to their secu-
rity and their ability to mount attacks as how they move it and store it.  
Raising and spending money involves people and transactions outside the 
terrorists’ immediate circles, and therefore beyond their control. This is 
when they become more vulnerable to detection. Furthermore, donors, es-
pecially wealthy ones, have become more cautious about giving to terrorist 
  
and African Studies of the University of London and the Harvard Law School, where he was 
Deputy Director of the International Tax Program. While at Harvard, Mr. Gordon completed 
extensive field work on law and development in both Indonesia and India and advised the 
government of Indonesia on the reform of tax, company, and securities laws. After leaving 
Harvard, he joined the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where he was both 
Senior Counsel and Senior Financial Sector Expert. In this capacity, he worked on a wide 
variety of issues, including governance, debt restructuring, financial integrity, and taxation. 
Following the 9/11 attacks he was appointed to the select IMF Task Force on Terrorism 
Finance and was a principal author of the report on the role of the IMF and World Bank in 
countering terrorism finance and money laundering.  
 10 Dr. Nikos Passas teaches at Northeastern University and specializes in the study of 
terrorism, white-collar crime, corruption, organized crime and international crime. He served 
as Northeastern University Press series editor on transnational crime and as associate editor 
on several journals. He is the editor of Crime, Law and Social Change: An International 
Journal. In 2005, he was elected to serve on the Board of Directors of the International Soci-
ety of Criminology. He acts as a consultant to law firms, private security companies, prose-
cutors, defendants, and various organizations, including the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. 
Centre for International Crime Prevention, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, the U.N. 
Development Program, the Commission of the EU, the German Parliament, and government 
agencies from various countries, including the U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S. 
Department of Justice. After September 11, 2001, Dr. Passas conducted research into the 
financial control of militant and extremist groups, trade diversion, hawala and other informal 
value transfer systems, crime vulnerabilities of the online payment infrastructure and finan-
cial misconduct hidden behind commodity trade transactions for the Financial Crimes En-
forcement Network and the National Institute of Justice. 
 11 SUE ECKERT, RICHARD GORDON & NIKOS PASSAS, REPORT ON TERRORISM FINANCING 
INDICATORS (forthcoming 2012).  
 12 Id. 
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groups, as the risks to their livelihood, reputations, and even their liberty, 
have grown as investigators have increased their knowledge of terrorist 
groups and their scrutiny of their contacts.  
Donors are growing more cautious about dealing with people they 
do not know. At the same time, the capture, death, and exposure of many 
old-time fund-raisers have forced terrorist groups to deploy new faces. 
There have been several cases reported where a fund-raiser has had his  
picture together with a known terrorist leader on his cell phone along with a 
message from the leader vouching for his bona fides to reassure a           
prospective donor that this is not an entrapment or sting operation.13 
Donors are also increasingly aware of the gap between what terror-
ist groups promise and what they deliver. The non-violent mass protests of 
the Arab Spring have been more effective at challenging oppressive or   
unpopular regimes than terrorists have. Also, terrorist groups have become 
increasingly obsessed with local, inter-communal or inter-ethnic disputes 
that have nothing to do with fighting foreign intervention or combating gov-
ernment policies.   
Therefore, terrorists have increasingly had to look to other ways to 
raise money, mainly by increasing their criminal activity. Kidnapping for 
ransom has become particularly popular, with the senior leadership of       
al-Qaeda also resorting to this method of fund raising. Al-Qaeda in the   
Islamic Maghreb, active in West Africa, has made hundreds of thousands of 
euros from kidnapping foreigners and demanding huge ransoms for their 
safe return. These acts have enabled it to fund its own activities, as well as 
the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria.14 
In addition to this income, Boko Haram has robbed banks, hijacked 
cars and raised money from other forms of violent crime.15 In Iraq as well, 
kidnapping, bank robbery and the robbing of jewelry stores are favored 
  
 13 Cf. Jonathan Wald, Trial Begins for Alleged Terrorist Financiers, CNN (Jan. 28, 2005), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-01-28/justice/yemeni.trial_1_qaeda-and-hamas-al-moayad-
mohammed-mohsen-yahya-zayed?_s=PM:LAW (discussing the trial of terrorists whose 
defense accused the government of entrapment).  
 14 See Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/ref 
erence/timestopics/organizations/a/al_qaeda_in_the_islamic_maghreb/index.htm (last updat-
ed Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing al-Qaeda kidnapping Westerners in order to finance terrorism 
efforts). Boko Haram killed over 250 people in January 2012 alone. Boko Haram Killed 935 
Since 2009—HRW, VANGUARD (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/boko-
haram-killed-935-since-2009-hrw/.  
 15 See Nkrumah Bankong-Obi, 2011: Boko Haram is Nigeria’s Demon of the Year, NEWS 
NIGERIA (Jan. 2, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://thenewsafrica.com/2012/01/02/the-demon-of-the-
year (discussing various violent acts of Boko Haram).  
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ways for al-Qaeda to raise money.16 Al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based group 
that achieved further notoriety in February 2012 when it was accepted into 
the al-Qaeda fold after more than three years of pleading, raises money from 
many sources: taxing local businessmen; mounting ‘tolls’ on roads under its 
control; participating in the charcoal trade; and operating the port of      
Kismayo, a main center for imports into and exports from southern         
Somalia.17 
Terrorist groups therefore are still able to raise money, though less 
easily and more sporadically than before. For most terrorist groups,        
especially small cells in Western countries cut off from the larger groups 
and lacking their capacity to commit high-profile crimes, the retreat of   
donors has seriously undermined their capacity to mount mass-casualty  
attacks.  
Nonetheless, terrorists remain active, and although we are unlikely 
to see another attack on the scale of the 9/11 attacks, the attacks that do oc-
cur are still devastating. The killings in Oslo and on the island of Utoya in 
Norway in July 2011, which killed seventy-seven and injured a further 151, 
were traumatic for more than the victims and their families.18 The           
perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, raised the money on his own and 
through credit card borrowing.19 His attacks were not cheap,20 but others 
have committed terrorist attacks for almost nothing, and although perhaps 
less lethal, they were no less effective in drawing attention to their cause 
and raising levels of public anxiety.21  
  
 16 Al-Qaeda in Iraq Looks for Fundraising Ideas, TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (July 26, 2011), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/8664536/Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq-looks-for-
fundraising-ideas.html.  
 17 Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Al-Shabaab Razes Somali Forests to Finance Jihad, 
TERRORISM MONITOR, Nov. 18, 2010, at 5, 5–6, available at http://www.jamestown.org/ 
uploads/media/TM_008_dadc5d.pdf .  
 18 Norwegian Serial Killer Declared Insane, SAVISTA MAG. (May 2012), available at 
http://www.savistamagazine.com/news/norwegian-serial-killer-declared-insane.  
 19 See Erica Alini, The Meticulous Planning of the Oslo Massacre, MACLEANS (July 28, 
2011), http://www2.macleans.ca/2011/07/28/the-meticulous-planning-of-the-oslo-massacre/ 
(reviewing Breivik’s personal manifesto and noting his detailed recording of accounting, 
stock market options, savings, and other financial efforts in preparation for the attack).  
 20 See id. (noting Breivik’s meticulous financial recording, including trying to raise three 
million euros via the stock market, moving in order to save money on rent, taking out a credit 
card for an additional thirty thousand euros in funding, and selling personal affects for fund-
ing). 
 21 See, e.g., Vikram Dodd & Alexadra Topping, Roshonara Choudhry Jailed for Life Over 
MP Attack, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara 
-choudhry-jailed-life-attack (describing Choudhry’s stabbing attack on a former government 
minister in May 2010); Kosovan Admits Shooting US Airmen at Frankfurt Airport, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14727975 (describing that 
Arid Uka’s jihad inspired attack in March 2011).   
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C. Assessing the Threat from Terrorism 
Although terrorists cannot be starved of all financial resources, and 
can mount attacks at their own expense and at little cost, the threat from 
terrorism, especially in Western countries and regions like Southeast Asia, 
has declined dramatically since 2007.22 In fact, there has not been a major 
terrorist attack in a Western country—apart from the Breivik attack—since 
the London bombings of July 2005.23 
The reason for this decline is a combination of factors, mostly a 
growing appreciation among vulnerable communities that terrorism does 
not deliver what its proponents advertise. Furthermore, apart from this lack 
of credibility, terrorist groups have lost any claim to legitimacy. Terrorism 
in Muslim-majority countries in particular, such as Iraq and Pakistan, does 
far more harm to the community it professes to defend than to any real or 
imagined enemy. The justification for terrorist activity is increasingly    
exposed as bogus and unsubstantiated, even by those who agree with its 
stated aims. The third area where terrorism has lost momentum is in the 
growth of popular, non-violent movements and the evidence of their suc-
cess. 
This is not just a factor of the Arab Spring, although the examples 
of Tunisia and, perhaps to a lesser extent Egypt, have shown the irrelevance 
of violence to the achievement of lasting political change. The spread of 
social media and the ability of oppositionists to find each other and join 
forces have empowered new groups of activists all over the world and    
amplified their voices. It was no more likely that al-Qaeda flags would be 
seen fluttering above the crowds in Tahrir Square, or on the streets of Tunis, 
than it was that they would appear in Zucotti Park in New York or at other    
Occupy Wall Street venues, or during the anti-corruption protests in New 
Delhi led by Anna Hazare. During these demonstrations, there has also been 
very little unprovoked use of force against the authorities.  
This spread of popular, non-violent protest has challenged the     
relevance of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that claim to be the only 
effective vanguard of change. Aiman Al Zawahiri has said repeatedly that 
real change in Egypt is not possible without violence, but the protestors in 
Cairo achieved more in a few months than he has achieved in a terrorist 
  
 22 Stephen Fidler, EU Terrorist Attacks Continue to Fall, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME 
BRUSSELS BLOG (Apr. 26, 2012, 5:22 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/04/26/eu-
terrorist-attacks-continue-fall/; see also NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, 2010 REPORT 
ON TERRORISM 8 (2011) (“Terrorist attacks in East Asia dipped to their lowest level in five 
years despite election-related attacks in Thailand and the Philippines.”).  
 23 Geoffrey Garrett, A Costly Diversion, AM. REV. (2011) (“There has been no major Is-
lamist terrorist attack on the West since the London bombings more than six years ago.”).  
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career that has lasted more than forty-five years.24 Even where protests have 
turned violent, such as in Libya or Syria, terrorist groups have had no role in 
this process.25  
So I answer my question, whether the difficulty that terrorist groups 
face in raising, storing and moving money is the reason for their increasing 
lack of viability with a qualified ‘yes.’ These two things are connected, but 
not in a direct, cause and effect relationship. Terrorists are facing difficulties 
in all areas, not just financial. They have difficulty projecting their message, 
gaining support, proving their relevance and, most importantly, mounting 
major attacks. 
III. ARE CFT REGIMES WORTH THE EFFORT? 
The second question is: Are international initiatives to counter the 
financing of terrorism worth the effort and resources required? 
It is inevitable that the bureaucratic response to a problem should 
lag behind the problem itself, and it is perhaps only now that the interna-
tional community is beginning to work out the best approach to counter the 
financing of terrorism. Eight of the nine Special Recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on terrorist financing were adopted in 
October 2001;26 commendably soon after the attacks of 9/11, but perhaps 
the worst time to craft an effective and balanced response.  
A. The FATF Standards and a Risk-Based Approach 
It was only in February 2012, after well over two years of          
consideration and debate, that FATF recast its forty recommendations on 
  
 24 See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Egypt (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt. 
Egyptians have inspired us, and they’ve done so by putting the lie to the idea that 
justice is best gained through violence. For an Egypt, it was the moral force of non-
violence–not terrorism, not mindless killing–but non-violence, moral force that 
bent the arch of history toward justice once more. 
Id.; see also Jed Lewison, President Obama on Egypt: “It Was the Moral Force of Non-
Violence,” DAILY KOS (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/11/942863/-
President-Obama-on-Egypt-It-was-the-moral-force-of-non-violence- (noting that President 
Obama’s assertion that the violence was no longer an accepted method of change was clearly 
a reference to al-Zawahiri).  
 25 See Syrian Protesters Take Inspiration from Libya, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-10-21/syria-clash-casualties/50855440/1 
(observing that during revolutionary activities in each nation, the civilian protesters and the 
current regime were the sole, central players).  
 26 UN Instruments and Other Relevant International Standards on Money-Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ 
money-laundering/Instruments-Standards.html (last visited May 19, 2012). The ninth Special 
Recommendation was adopted in October 2004. Id.  
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Anti-Money Laundering and its nine Special Recommendations on      
Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and amalgamated them into one 
group.27 This process provided a timely reappraisal of the Special          
Recommendations. Most notably, it emphasized the importance of states 
taking a risk-based approach to terrorist financing.28 This means that states 
may do less in areas where they assess the risk to be low, though,           
conversely, they should do more where they see the risk as high. 
The proponents of a risk-based approach have long argued that a 
blanket application of rules and regulations, especially in states with a less 
developed financial services sector, sets the stage for failure.29 The near 
impossibility of achieving full compliance with all nine Special             
Recommendations, let alone of assuring effective implementation, may 
have led some states to try less hard to become at least partially compliant.30 
Where states are encouraged to focus on areas of particular vulnerability, 
and judged by their neighbors on their performance against those risks, they 
are perhaps more likely to achieve an appropriate level of protection.  
FATF recommendations on terrorist financing are universally      
accepted as the standard for states to reach. The core FATF membership of 
  
 27 See generally FATF, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION (2012) [hereinafter FATF INT’L 
STANDARDS], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/mutualevaluations/key/fatfreco 
mmendations2012.html (FATF final report consolidating the Forty Recommendations and 
the Nine Special Recommendations).  
 28 See id. at 8 (recognizing the need for stronger requirements that also allow countries to 
tailor their approach in order to most effectively combat terrorism financing); see also Robert 
E. Elliott & Koker Christensen, Fasken Martineau LLP, The Evolution of International AML 
and CTF Standards: A Review of the Revised FATF Recommendations, FIN. INST. BULL., 
Mar. 15, 2012, at 1, available at http://www.fasken.com/en/the-evolution-of-international-
aml-and-ctf-standards-a-review-of-the-revised-fatf-recommendations/ (“The FATF Recom-
mendations address new and emerging risks and, importantly, will allow countries to choose 
to implement a more flexible risk-based approach that would allow countries . . . to focus 
scarce resources on higher-risk areas.”).  
 29 See FATF, RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 9–10 (2008), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/58/41584211.pdf (stating adoption of risk based ap-
proach requires resources and expertise, development of procedures and systems, and per-
sonnel training). 
 30 Id. at 8 (noting that the risk-based approach of the Recommendations should encourage 
resources to be used efficiently, but can sometimes lead to a “tick box” approach that focuses 
on regulation rather than combating terrorist financing). FATF and affiliated FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies conduct mutual evaluations of compliance with the FATF recommenda-
tions, scoring countries as Compliant, Largely Compliant, Partially Compliant or Non-
Compliant. See FATF, ANNUAL REPORT 2010–2011, at 12–13 (2012), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FORMATTED%20ANNUAL%20 
REPORT%20FOR%20PRINTING.pdf (listing all FATF members and their compliance 
rating for each Recommendation).  
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thirty-four states31 includes all Permanent Members of the Security Council 
and all but two states members of the G20.32 Security Council resolutions 
encourage states to implement the standards and in all, including the    
membership of the FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), over 180 of the 
193 members of the U.N. have agreed to try to implement the forty FATF 
recommendations and to open themselves to an evaluation of their progress 
by their peers.33  
In the context of terrorism, the two most relevant FATF              
recommendations are Recommendation 5 on the criminalizing of terrorist 
financing,34 and Recommendation 6 on targeted financial sanctions related 
to terrorism and terrorist financing.35 These two recommendations, and their 
accompanying interpretive notes, set out a thorough set of principles for 
governments to follow. The interpretive note for Recommendation 6      
explains in detail the criteria for designation under Security Council      
resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1267 (1999), both adopted under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter, which require that states have the legal ability to     
impose a financial assets freeze against terrorists as defined nationally 
(1373) or by the Security Council (1267).36 The note also has useful things 
to say about the need to do so “without delay,” which it recommends should 
mean in a matter of hours.37 Recommendation 8 on non-profit organizations; 
Recommendations 14, 15, 16 and 32 on money transfer systems, including 
cash couriers, Recommendations 20 and 29 on Suspicious Transaction   
Reporting and Financial Intelligence Units, and Recommendations 36 to 40 
on international cooperation are also highly relevant to an effective CFT     
regime.38 
  
 31 FATF Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/member 
sandobservers/ (last visited May 19, 2012). The European Commission and the Gulf Cooper-
ation Council are also members of FATF. Id.  
 32 Compare id., and Membership in 2012, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un. 
org/sc/members.asp (last visited May 19, 2012), with G20 Members, G20 INFO. CENTRE, 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/members.html (last visited May 19, 2012) (Indonesia and Saudi 
Arabia are G20 members but not FATF members). 
 33 See, e.g., S.C. Res 1617, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); see also Press 
Release, FATF, FATF Steps up the Fight Against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financ-
ing (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/17/0,3746,en_32250379 
_32236920_49656209_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
 34 FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 8. 
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. at 43–44 (providing the legal basis for countries’ to freeze assets as necessary).  
 37 See id. at 122 (“The phrase without delay means, ideally within a matter of hours of a 
designation by the United Nations Security Council or its relevant Sanctions Committee.”); 
see also id. at 43, 49 (providing detail of circumstances that would require a country to act to 
freeze assets without delay).  
 38 See id. at 4–5 (listing the Recommendations by number and name).  
File: Barrett 2 Created on: 6/2/2012 12:23:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 5:22:00 PM 
2012] PREVENTING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 729 
But the first two Recommendations, one on assessing risk and     
applying a risk-based approach, and the other on national cooperation and 
coordination, set the tone for the rest and are as significant as any other in 
terms of ensuring that the response in the financial sector is properly      
calibrated to the threat. 
The issue that remains largely unaddressed is the methodology by 
which states and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs) should make their assessment of the threat.39 The interpretive 
note to Recommendation 1 sensibly suggests that states should identify and 
assess their money laundering and terrorist financing risks on an ‘on-going’ 
basis, keep the assessments up-to-date, and have mechanisms to relay it to 
those that need it in both the public and private sector.40 But when it comes 
to how to do all this, the interpretive note suggests only that countries take 
“appropriate steps.”41 However appropriate the steps, the destination can 
often remain elusive. 
The interpretive note to Recommendation 1 also deals with the    
obligations for financial institutions and DNFBPs to assess the risk, and 
says that they should have “appropriate mechanisms” to provide these    
assessments to the competent authorities.42 The development and            
implementation of an effective risk-based model to counter the financing of 
terrorism depends on a close collaboration between national authorities and 
the private sector, drawing on the complementary skills of both groups; 
FATF rightly recognizes the importance of the public-private partnership in 
this respect.43   
However, a frank exchange between the public and private sector 
has not thus far proved easy, not least because of the difficulty of sharing 
classified information with a non-governmental body. But without some 
enhanced dialogue between national authorities who know about terrorism, 
and private sector experts who know about finance, it is unlikely that any 
risk assessment will be as rich as it needs to be to ensure sufficient and  
  
 39 FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 50, ¶ 6 (c) (providing only that countries 
should have mechanisms for financial institutions and DNFBPs to freeze assets, but no guid-
ance in identifying the targeted assets). However, FATF is currently up-dating its guidance 
for states on risk-based analysis, and the World Bank is in the process of developing a Risk 
and Vulnerability Assessment Methodology and Tool. 
 40 Id. at 32.  
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING ¶ 1.6 (2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20ML%20and%20TF.pdf (“The Guidance recognises 
that each country and its national authorities, in partnership with its financial institutions, 
will need to identify the most appropriate regime, tailored to address individual country 
risks.”).  
File: Barrett 2 Created on:  6/2/2012 12:23:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 5:22:00 PM 
730 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:719 
proportionate counter measures, or, as the interpretive note for FATF    
Recommendation 5 puts it, action that is “effective, proportionate and    
dissuasive.”44 
B. The Role of the Private Sector 
Effective CFT work depends on the active and committed            
involvement of the private sector. It is here that financial activity related to 
terrorism is most likely to become visible; and banks and related businesses 
are ideally placed to help in the detection and investigation of terrorist   
offences, given an appropriate legal framework and accepting the need to 
protect the privacy rights of the individual. Banks know where their       
customers are, where they have been, and often where they are going. They 
know their spending patterns and their sources of income. They know their 
business relationships and their job history. 
Much of the private sector has been—and remains—an enthusiastic 
partner in trying to counter the financing of terrorism.45 Banks and other 
financial institutions have been prepared to absorb the costs associated with 
complying with a raft of new regulations; they have effectively paid to turn 
away business.  However, they have also looked to states for guidance, and 
in the absence of feedback on the value of their contribution and briefing on 
where their efforts could do most good, many private sector companies have 
fulfilled their CFT obligations as much out of fear of falling foul of the  
regulator as in the hope of making a significant contribution to the         
suppression of terrorism. 
This is not a criticism. States cannot expect the private sector to 
have a better idea of what terrorist financing looks like than states do   
themselves. States generally only learn how a terrorist crime has been    
financed once it has happened and an investigation has turned up the      
information. Even then, the financing of one operation has rarely, if ever, 
replicated the financing of another. Also, where a terrorist attack has been 
funded by credit card fraud, or some other common form of crime, it has 
generally not been possible, even with hindsight, to find an indicator that 
might have suggested the true purpose of the offence.46 
  
 44 FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 37.  
 45 See generally David J. Rothkopf, Business Versus Terror, FOREIGN POL’Y, May–June 
2002, at 52, 52–64 (describing the many ways in which the private sector will be central to 
the fight against terror). 
 46 See Anne L. Clunan, U.S. and International Response to Terrorism Financing, 4 
STRATEGIC INSIGHTS 1 (2005), available at http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc 
/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Jan/clunanJan05.pdf (noting that the use of funds for the 
planning and execution of a terrorist attack is often made of many small, individual, and 
legal transactions that cannot be linked to a crime until after the crime occurs).  
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To illustrate the problem, although bank staff and others who work 
in the financial sector are far more knowledgeable and better trained than 
they were ten years ago, and well-versed in the importance of customer due 
diligence checks and the system for reporting suspicious activity or      
transactions, their dedication has not resulted in any great number of      
disrupted plots. The reporting in the U.S. of nearly one and a half million 
incidents of suspicious activity under the Bank Secrecy Act47 in 2011 (and 
not many less in 2010) may have helped move forward several terrorism-
related investigations, but initiated only a tiny number of cases which led to 
a prosecution related to terrorism.48 
C. The Importance of Proportionality 
It is right to ask then if all the effort demanded of both the public 
and private sector is worth the resources required. If the international com-
munity is to maintain public confidence in the efficiency and value of its 
CFT activity, it is important to ensure a general agreement that the measures 
taken to combat terrorism are proportionate to the threat. The reason that 
terrorism survives is that it can be a successful political tactic for groups 
that lack the capacity or support to oppose or promote policies through   
other, legitimate means. The objective of terrorists is to persuade a         
government or international organization to do something or to abstain from 
doing something by terrorizing their public constituency. Killing is a means 
to this end, not an end in itself. Terrorists will not do more than they have to 
in order to achieve their objectives. 
If the main terrorist objective is to raise public anxiety to the level 
that forces governments to change their policies, it seems perverse that  
governments should help them do so. But public anxiety can be as          
responsive to terrorist counter measures as it can be to terrorism itself. The 
checks at airports have become routine; passengers accept them as part of 
the cost of travel, but they do not build the resilience of the travelling public 
to the idea of terrorism. These and other visible and less visible counter-
measures, tend to suggest that terrorists are ubiquitous, and that they may 
strike at any moment, should we lower our defenses.  
This is clearly not the case, but counter-measures seem to be        
increasing at the same time as both politicians and experts agree that the 
threat is in decline. The evolution of the bureaucratic response to the     
  
 47 C.M. Matthews, Fincen Says SARs Reached All-Time in 2011, WALL ST. J.: 
CORRUPTION CURRENTS BLOG (May 14, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/05/14/fincen-says-sars-reached-all-time-in-2011/.  
 48 See Investigations Assisted by FinCEN Data: Involving SARs, FIN. CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/sar_case_example_list.html 
?catid=00002 (last visited May 19, 2012) (providing a comprehensive list of FinCEN’s in-
vestigations involving SARs, with only two directly related to terrorism). 
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problem is lagging too far behind the evolution of the problem itself. It has 
become disproportionate to the threat. If the perception of disproportionality 
seeps into the public consciousness, the measures taken to protect society 
from terrorism, whether in the financial sector or elsewhere, will begin to 
lose their effect. Those responsible for implementing the rules will become 
less rigorous, and those responsible for complying with the rules will     
become less caring.  
IV. DEVELOPING PROPORTIONAL TECHNIQUES 
The third and final question is: How do we develop counter-terrorist 
financing techniques in a way that ensures their proportionality to the threat 
and the most effective use of resources? 
It would be both politically and practically unacceptable to roll back 
the measures taken since September 2001 to counter the financing of      
terrorism. But just as FATF recommends that countries keep their threat 
assessment up-to-date,49 so too must the international community keep its 
counter-measures up to date.  
The best way to do this is by encouraging greater cooperation      
between states through regional and international consultations that also 
allow for input and reaction from the private sector. As well as introducing 
better mechanisms to ensure the proper sharing of information between 
agencies, governments should follow the lead of states that have exploited 
the potential contribution from, and understood the cost to, the private    
sector in designing and implementing CFT measures. Inevitably, the line is 
thin between rules designed to prevent terrorism financing and rules that are 
more generally intended to regulate the financial sector. States should be 
clear about their main objective, and where it is clearly focused on terrorist 
financing, they should be prepared to enlist the help of the private sector in 
spotting the opportunities for terrorist financing to go unnoticed. 
Although by no means universally applied, the trend towards a 
more inclusive approach is noticeable in many countries.50 FATF itself has 
placed great importance on consulting with the private sector, and led by 
example in the redesign of its forty recommendations.51 But old habits die 
  
 49 FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 85.  
 50 See id. at 9 (“FATF is committed to maintaining a close and constructive dialogue with 
the private sector, civil society, and other interested parties, as important partners in ensuring 
the integrity of the financial system.”). 
 51 See MARTIN SAUNDERS ET AL., CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE NEW FATF 40 
RECOMMENDATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2012), available at http:// 
www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2012/02/the_new_fatf_40_recomme
ndationsaframeworkfo.html (“The revised FATF Recommendations also recognise the diffi-
culties that the private sector face in relation to data protection and privacy laws in relation to 
intra-group cooperation and reliance, and FATF have indicated that it is considering a coor-
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hard, and there are still too many barriers to effective information sharing 
and consultation. Governments could do more to ensure that their security 
and intelligence bodies share information about terrorist trends between 
each other and with law enforcement agencies. Governments should also 
harness the commitment and expertise of the private sector in their overall 
efforts to combat terrorism.  
Clearly, there are important confidentiality issues that limit the  
ability of states to share complete details of the terrorist threat with other 
governments, let alone with the private sector, just as there are privacy   
issues that quite properly limit the ability of the private sector to release 
information about their clients to the states. Within a proper legal and    
administrative framework, the public and private sectors could and should 
work more closely together, at a local, national and even at an international 
level. 
A. Keeping CFT Measures Flexible 
It is important that the expectations of what financial sanctions and 
other CFT measures can achieve remain realistic; they can only ever be just 
one dimension of a far wider counter-terrorism strategy. Perhaps forced in 
part by the steady evolution of CFT activity, but also in responding to    
opportunities as they present themselves, terrorists are constantly changing 
the ways by which they raise and use funds. The international response 
needs to be equally dynamic. Despite the work done by FATF, the basic 
framework, focusing on preventing the use of formal sector institutions for 
cross-border transfers of value, remains largely unchanged. Further work is 
necessary to ensure that alternative and new methods of financing terrorism, 
such as cash-couriers, stored-value instruments, and informal value transfer 
systems (IVTS), are properly considered and form part of the international 
regime. 
CFT measures are considered to be among the most effective ways 
to limit the incidence of terrorism, yet the value of sanctions as a tool does 
not rate particularly high among them. In order to maintain public support 
for international and national sanctions, states should be ready to explain 
both the symbolic and practical value of this method of restricting          
financing, and ensure that the targets of the sanctions regimes are           
individuals and groups who are clearly affected by them. Sanctions are a 
fairly blunt instrument, but a flexible and dynamic approach can ensure that 
the collateral damage they cause is limited to the greatest extent possible, 
  
dinated process to further examine the issue.”). Also, the interpretive note to Recommenda-
tion 1, albeit in a footnote, recognizes the relevance of “supra-national” risk assessments to 
national action. FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 32, n.1.  
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especially when applied in the nonprofit sector, where terrorist financing is 
hiding behind ostensibly charitable activity.52 
B. The Need to Share Intelligence 
All CFT activity should take place according to a well-considered 
evaluation of the risks of terrorist attack. Just as CFT regulations address the 
international dimensions of terrorism, so too should the threat assessment. 
The FATF recommendations acknowledge this,53 but intelligence is rarely 
shared beyond a bilateral basis, except between close allies.54 The           
circumspection about sharing intelligence is based on a lack of trust and a 
desire to protect sources.55 
Good intelligence is both a valuable and tradable commodity, as 
well as being difficult to acquire, and it is hardly surprising that the        
traditions of secrecy are hard to break down. Even the best intelligence has 
no value unless it can be used, and intelligence on terrorist threats does not 
need to be guarded by the same rules as other political or commercial     
information. No state is in competition with another in the world of        
terrorism. The international consequences of an attack on any one country 
are well accepted, and it is in the interest of every state to collect and     
disseminate as much intelligence on terrorism as possible, provided that the 
mechanisms for doing so are robust enough to withstand discovery by the 
terrorists or their sympathizers, and provided that the supplying state is  
consulted before any action is taken based on the information. 
Another advantage of sharing terrorist intelligence is that it offers 
an opportunity to put small snippets of information into a broader context; 
  
 52 See WATSON INST. FOR INT’L STUD., STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH 
FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 24–38 (2012), available at http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/ 
Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf (describing the current practices U.N. Security Coun-
cil Sanctions Committee and how to improve the sanctions process in the areas of designa-
tion or listing procedures, procedural operations of the committees, and delisting proce-
dures). 
 53 FATF INT’L STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 11 (discussing the dimensions to consider 
under the FATF risk-based approach in assessing threats).  
 54 See, e.g., Welcome to the Technical Cooperation Program, TECH. COOPERATION PROG., 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ttcp/ (last updated June 14, 2011) (“The Technical Cooperation 
Program (TTCP) is an international organization that collaborates in defence scientific and 
technical information exchange; program harmonization and alignment; and shared research 
activities for the five nations.”). Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S. are 
all members of the TTCP, also known as the “five eyes” arrangement. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL MARKINGS IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 42 (2008), available at 
http://qaisc.org/uploads/QAISC_DoD_Classified_Markings_Manual.pdf.  
 55 See generally RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTELLIGENCE 
INFORMATION: NEED-TO-KNOW VS. NEED-TO-SHARE (2011) (reviewing the challenges and 
benefits presented by the information sharing environment). 
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to pool together pieces of information that on their own have little meaning 
or significance. Where the intelligence concerns possible terrorist financing, 
the involvement of experts from the private sector adds to the likelihood 
that the interpretation and context are correct. 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) have made enormous advances 
towards genuine cooperation, both in regional groupings and through the 
Egmont Group which incorporates the FIUs of 127 states.56 However, in 
some countries the FIU lacks sufficient political support to contribute to its 
full potential, and in most countries FIUs, despite their specialist skills and 
knowledge, are not fully accepted as part of the intelligence and law       
enforcement structure that is charged with combating terrorism.57 In       
addition to following and plotting trends in terrorist financing, FIUs could 
provide a useful means of bringing the public and private sectors into closer 
alliance. This role may develop, but it will probably follow successful local 
initiatives; national and international bodies should find ways to accelerate 
the process. 
C. The Focus of Future Effort 
The decline in the terrorist threat may lead in due course to the    
reduction of budgets for counter terrorism and the diversion of interest 
elsewhere, but the momentum created by the response to the attacks of 9/11 
will not die away quickly. While it remains, we should accept that although 
the regimes set up to combat the financing of terrorism have not shown 
dramatic results, they have contributed to the current difficulties that      
terrorist groups face in raising, storing and moving significant amounts of 
money. Moreover, they have acted as a deterrent to donors. 
However, the international community should use the breathing 
space before another major wave of attacks forces it back into over-reaction, 
to take a long hard look at what we are doing and why. We need to identify 
better ways to measure our successes and recognize our failures, and be 
quick to reinforce the former and change our methodology to eliminate the 
latter. We must ensure that action taken to combat terrorist financing is  
proportionate to the threat and reflects what is going on in the terrorists’ 
world rather than in our own. Furthermore, we should draw on the          
investment made in all countries to understand how terrorists operate and 
what they plan to do. We can save a great deal of time, money and anxiety 
  
 56 List of Members, EGMONT GROUP, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members 
(last visited May 19, 2012). 
 57 See J.F. Thony, Processing Financial Information in Money Laundering Matters: The 
Financial Intelligence Units, 4 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 257, 277 (1996) (ob-
serving that anti-laundering tools are often seen as a political arm, rather than part of the law 
enforcement structure).   
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by sharing our experiences and knowledge, both within national and      
international governmental structures, and within the private sector. 
Getting counter-terrorism right in all its aspects, including in coun-
tering the financing of terrorism, will not only lead to less terrorism, but 
also help build the resilience of the public to terrorist attacks. This will  
lower the impact of terrorism and reduce its attraction as a political tool. 
Our success will not necessarily come from further rules and regulations, it 
will come from ensuring that the rules and regulations that we do have, or 
introduce, produce the results that we want. This will require flexibility and 
regular reassessments of the cost effectiveness of what we are doing. 
